Abstract: Aim of this article is to point out the recent development of the principle of abuse of rights in tax and administrative law. Subject of this article is not abuse of discretion, abuse of rule of law, abuse of power or eventual other abuses. Although abuse of rights is traditionally category of private law, we could observe application of this institute in European public law including the Czech public law.
Introduction
Aim of this article is to point out the recent development of the principle of abuse of rights in tax and administrative law. Subject of this article is not abuse of discretion, abuse of rule of law, abuse of power or eventual other abuses. Although abuse of rights is traditionally category of private law, we could observe application of this institute in European public law including the Czech public law.
Historically, abuse of rights had been observed in the times of Roman law and fi rstly was connected with property law. Th en it spread further in the whole private law. Although I have not found sources describing abuse of law in tax law or other branches of public law in history, I am convinced that reason for this fact is only absence of reference. If taxes and tax law exist as long as our society, there had to be attempts to reduce taxes always. While describing abuse of law and comparing various attitudes, diff erences between legal systems and national jurisdictions are important. It is to note one more fact: tax law is in the Czech Republic regarded as part of public law, contrary to some Western jurisdictions. Moreover, according to some opinions, common law has no general doctrine of abuse of law.
Defi nition of abuse of rights does not exist in the Czech law and neither in many other countries. Abuse of rights is connected with subjective rights. Several authors defi ned abuse of rights, their papers will be reff ered also later. According to Paul Lasok "abuse" is rhetorical device whose purpose is to express disagreement with particular, but lawful, exercise of rights. French courts developed concept of abuse of rights to cope with misuses of unqualifi ed rights. According Hui Ling McCarthy (analysing abuse of rights in connection with VAT planning -see further reference) there is still no precise defi nition of "abuse of rights". Instead there is an evolving body of EU case law, formulating the circumstances in which abuse may be present. In the absence of national abuse provisions prescribing those circumstances, the purpose of the doctrine is to catch cases where either a person is attempting to rely on a European legal right to circumvent or displace national law, or a person is looking to gain a fi nancial or other advantage by way of an abusive use of Community law. Czech author Zdeněk Pulkrábek refers to French defi nition which construes abuse of law broadly and regards intent to cause somebody harm as a feature of abuse of law. According to other opinion the attribute is illegal caused behaviour which diff ers from acting of ordinary, reasonable and vigilant individual. His third quotation and criterion of abuse of law is economic and social purpose of law. What all defi nitions have in common, is purpose or intent to harm other person (or society) and get an advantage. Th e way how to reach this is related to creation of situation which diff ers from original one, that means we see a reconstruction or simmulation. Th e line between legal and illegal behaviour is very diffi cult to fi nd since there are legal ways how to reduce tax base (or observe other rules both in letter and spirit).
To describe theory of abuse of rights (or law), I refer to monography of Czech author Zdeněk Pulkrábek.
1 Although this work was done for private (civil) law, some of thoughts of author can be useful. Abuse of rights relates to exercise of rights (also fi ling a suit could be considered as abuse of rights). Pulkrábek defi nes abuse of law as such a relying on the law which is somehow faulty. Means to prevent defectiveness of that is to apply the principle of abuse of law. Defective can be relying on the law, result of exercise of rights or the law itself. Interpretation of the terms mentioned above is related to values and principles applied by interpreter. As a ground for interpretation serves idea of purpose of law, requirement for law to be balanced, harmonious and moral, ethical and fair. Purpose of law is fundamental for law and constitutionally based in preambule of the Czech constitution. Purpose of law is to provide benefi ts for entitled persons, to satisfy their needs and interests and the aims of this stipulations are fairness, justice, equity. Th e abuse of law should impact fi rstly on the law itself (derogation), secondly on behaviour of person entitled of rights and person obliged to do something (regulation) and thirdly on enforcement of the law. Abuse of rights is coupled with behaviour of entitled person or with behaviour of person obliged to do something, with their position, with unilateral act or other acts (objection, protest, notice, dismissal, motion, action etc.). Essential is to answer what constitutes abuse of rights and how is the principle to be applied. Abused can be only rights -where is not right (law), there is no abuse. Th e content of the law can be recognized solely under particular circumstances, abuse of law is not abstract category. Derogation of abused rights could be absolute or partial. Eff ects of derogation of abused right are ex nunc or ex tunc -it depends on the fact if the abuse there was from the beginning of the transaction. Th e act arised from abused right is null and void and the court must take it into account ex off o.
Pulkrábek distinguishes four forms of abuse of law:
1. entitled person intends to harm other; damage could be any detriment or disadvantage, 2. entitled person can follow other purpose than that which is defi ned by the law, 3. entitled person is mistaken and supposes benefi t, 4. entitled person is only stubborn, the aim is solely exercise of right, not the consequences of that exercise.
Pulkrábek believes that also negligible, very small benefi t should be protected. Author quotes Swiss author H. Merz who regards as general principle obligation to exercise rights in the most modest manner. In opinion of Pulkrábek, defectiveness in abuse of law is based also on other factors (diff erent from the contradiction to purpose of law): that is contradiction to good moral, serious contradiction between benefi t and harm, exercise of rights is unscrupulous to interests of obliged person, contradiction in own behaviour and confl ict with public interest. Abuse of law relates both to objective contradiction to purpose of law (connected to benefi t) and subjective contradiction to purpose of law (connected to intention of acting person). According to author of monography, abuse can concern any right. Contrary to principle of abuse of rights there is requirement of legal certainty.
Comparing above mentioned ideas with fundamental principles of public law, several issues emerge. Firstly, accordance with public interest is prescribed by the Czech Administrative Procedure Code. Fundamental principles are elaborated in detail in particular provisions in administrative law. Application of law deals more with particular breach of law then solely with breach of principle, both in administrative and judicial procedures. To reject the right (application, request) only on the basis of contradiction with public interest is very rare and usually it is related to application of abuse of law or circumvention of law. On the other hand, to grant right solely on the basis of application of principle has been observed several times (it is to note that it was chiefl y in judicial practice).
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Th ere are still other concepts similar to abuse of law or other terms for same or similar situations. To name some of them, there is malice, false intent, absence of good faith, bullying, harassment. Especially in tax law is to refer to anti-avoidance rule (which difers from evasion). Abused can be both substantive and process law.
Abuse of law is associated fundamentally with interpretation of law. Textualists and contextualists discuss the issue, we can take into account natural justice and positivism etc. Some authors speak about abuse of interpretation.
2 According to Steven Dean and Lawrence Solan 3 "the goal of statutory interpretation is to fi nd and enforce the intended meaning of the legislature and that the best evidence of this intent is the language of the statute". Tax shelters take advantage of the fl exibility of words and of the gaps in legislation. Authors remark on recent use of rule of lenity by courts. According to this rule (originated in penal law) statutes should be strictly construed against the government. Lexis survey found that federal and state courts used the word "intent" in their decisions 60.000 times in ten years period. Some courts found intent of legislator in the language of the statute, some outside of it. According to Justice Scalia meaning can be understood in accord with context and ordinary usage of the language (for this the whole Congress voted) and as compatible with surrounding body of law, he would not permit to examine any historical and legislative material. He does not regard intent of legislator as the proper criterion of the law. Authors believe that textualists consider legislative history as unreliable and weak argument and aggrandizing the role of congressional committees. Th e lenity principle has been used both in civil and criminal cases. Th e U. S. Supreme Court applied it in civil cases where the statute in question had both civil and criminal remedies. Th is could be inspirative also for the Czech law. Authors of the paper do not believe that applying lenity rule to Tax Code is likely and that it would have good result. In fact, lenity rule was articulated by Chief Justice John Marshall in United States v. Fischer in 1805. Due to interpretation government was given priority over other creditors. Practically, where administrative agencies are entitled to enforce law bouth through civil courts and criminal law, they become more agressive over time. Tax fraud has a strong mens rea (quilty mind) element. Th is rule then can resolve an ambiguity. Th ese tools come into operation not in the beginning of their process but in the end of construing. Th is is the function of judiciary and of course also of tax administration. Although judges use reasonableness as key principle and when can not determine intent of the legislature, they resolve disputes in favor of taxpayers, result is uncertainty. Also sta-tistics does not help: victories of government and taxpayers are almost the same. As a solution authors do not see aggressive purposive aproach (it is not credible) but think that anti-abuse doctrines are important, regardless if they are established in statutes or judicially. In fact they permit courts to focus on statute´s purpose without looking outside its language.
Gianluigi Palombella 4 considers abuse of rights from the point of view of rule of law. Author regards using abuse of law as the resistance of formal principles as a shield to hide objectives incompatible with the legal order and then quotes Justice Antonin Scalia´s question whether to decide case on the basis of "totality of factual circumstances" or to defi ne general rule.
I. European law and abuse of rights
Th e abuse of rights in European law shines through all this paper. I would like to highlight few of best analysis on this topic. Th e paper devoted to origins and history of the principle was elaborated by Paul Lasok. 5 He splits up the situations of abuse of EC law into abuse of 1. private persons and 2. member states and further in three contexts:
1. reliance upon EC law which results in abuse of domestic law, 2. application of EC law leads to extracting (fi nancial) benefi t from the Community, 3. application of harmonised legislation which does not contain explicitly anti-abuse rule.
None of these situations has a character of dishonesty or fraud. To defi ne the terms due to linguistic diff erences, author divides: "right" is subjective and "law" is objective. Also Lasok sees the responsibility of legislature to defi ne what is "right" and what is "wrong". And also points out the diff erence between legislative approach (that means if legislature defi nes abuse of law) and jurisprudential approach (technically imposing limits on the exersice of lawful right). Lasok compares -in common law of England and Wales non-existing -doctrine of abuse of law to principles of equity and in European law with principle if proportionality. Abuse of law is discussed since attempts to avoid an abligation mean putting it in another way, to create situation that falls outside the scope of the obligation. Th is resulted in need for more sophisticated approach to reddress the situation and use of more complex remedy as liberty or freedom are abused. Author refers to raids on the revenue and diff erences on just minimising tax liability (footnote 14), to the cases where existence of the concept of abuse of law was denied by Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom in 1998 (case Kefalas -footnote 23, see this paper for further reference) and abuse of power by the States (misuse of power and acting outside the scope of power which is extremely diffi cult to recognize in public law). As to abuse of rights Lasok highlights that intensity of disparity in the situation with abuse of rights must be so great that the only sensible explanation for the exercise of the right is the predominant purpose to cause harm to another. In this point I must refer to other concepts where suffi cient is causing harm, regardless of intensity of the act and other reasons of the act. Lasok came to conclusions that:
1. Distinction between defi nition of right and abuse of right is tenuous, abuse of rights is better expressed with particular types of limitation of its exercise, what matters is not legal nature of origin of limitation but its rationale.
2. Th ere is no reason why public bodies should be in diff erent legal position -the other concept is misuse of power rather than right, diff erences in concepts are rather material than formal.
3. Abuse of right is based on the end contrary of purpose served by the right or its excessive or disproportionate manner.
4. Matterial diff erences in particular cases must be emphasized.
5
. Th e concept of abuse of rights is not suited to converse, that is, the conduct of harmed persons is not object of this concept, certainly in public law.
In case C-367/96 Kefalas v. Greece, the ECJ was asked whether national court should apply domestic defi niton of abuse of right or of Community. Th e ECJ held that a domestic anti-abuse rule can, under Community law, be applied for the purpose of assessing whether or not the exercise of a right under EC law is "abusive" but "the application of such a national rule must not prejudice the full eff ect and uniform application of Community law in the Member States…" and that "it is not open to national courts, when assessing the exercise of a right arising from a provision of Community law, to alter the scope of that provision or to compromise the objectives pursued by it". According to Lasok the substantive elements of the principle are:
1. reliance on a provision of EC law, 2. the derivation of an improper advantage to the detriment of another, and 3. the advantage must be manifestly contrary to the objective of the provision relied upon. Th ere is also an evidential requirement: the evidence of abuse must be "suffi ciently telling".
In 6 points out that the ECJ was clear that the doctrine was not a general anti-avoidance principle, nor could it be used to invalidate all structures where tax mitigation comprised merely one of a number of drivers. Indeed, the doctrine does not operate in a vacuum -it must be considered in conjunction with other well-established principles of Community law, such as legal certainty and fi scal neutrality.
Lasok regards reliance on EC law to abuse domestic law as real problem and seen from the perspective of domestic law, EC law is nothing other than vast avoidance exercise. Author illustrates this on several examples (reimports, abuse of freedom of establishment in order to circumvent the minimum capital requirements in domestic country etc.). Application of EC law does not necessarily mean that domestic concept of abuse of law can not be applied at all but it must be in compliance with EC law.
Th e third group of abuses deals with obtaining benefi t from EC by direct application of EC provisions. Th ere the ECJ held again as necessary conditions for abuse of law meeting both objective and subjective criteria. Anti-avoidance or anti-abuse rule is set up in article 4(3) of Council Regulation No. 2988/95. Defi niton labels abusive acts as acts established to have as their purpose the obtaining of an advantage contrary to the objectives of Community law by artificially creating the conditions required for obtaining that advantage which would result in either the failure to obtain the advantage or, if it had been obtained, the withdrawal of the advantage. 
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II. Tax law and abuse of rights
As I mentioned above, tax law is old as society and therefore intention to reduce tax burden is old alike. Serious reference is observed in modern history. Especially recently, there is concern on issues of abuse of tax law. Roots of this matter must be seen in economic and social reality. As to legal point of view, concept of abuse of law or similar concept such as sham doctrine, fraus legis doctrine or doctrine "substance over form" (dissimulation doctrine) are observed in many jurisdictions, regardless of their content.
In focused comparison 7 with illustrative case law examples authors concluded that tax avoidance is problem for all countries. Th ey start with drawing the line between "mitigation" as legal reducing one´s tax, "evasion" as lying about one´s income and "avoidance" which is between two and means contriving artifi cial transactions to reduce tax. According authors this is description rather then defi nition. Main authors with Svenja Brandt explain German civil law doctrine of abuse of right. Its underlying principle is good faith, stipulated in Para. 242 of German Civil Code (Mißbrauchsverbot), and broadly judicially interpreted (original Schikaneverbot according to Para. 226 BGB has been seldom applied). Four categories of abuse of rights are:
1. the prohibition on inconsistent behaviour; 2. the prohibition on exercising rights which, though valid, were fraudulently acquired; Test of inadequacy asks whether an objective third party, in the same circumstances and with the same economic purpose as the taxpayer, would have proceeded as the taxpayer did.
Example of Croatia shows that this country has no anti-avoidance provisions and deals only with sham doctrine (above all, Croatia is reportedly focused on tax evasion). Interestingly, this doctrine has never been used (I remind that the article was published in 2008). Sham is transaction which is not real. Authors prefer as a model Hungary which is only country in Eastern Europe that enacted general anti-avodance rule (Para. 1/7 of Tax Administration Act). It is based on abuse of law or fraus legis doctrine, similar to Germany´s model. Hungary´s antiavoidance rule provides that transaction whose purpose is to avoid tax would be taxed according to its economic base (we can call it also doctrine "substance over form"). By the way, as I mention in more detailed manner for the Czech Republic later, information that Hungary is sole Eastern country with this rule is not correct.
New Zealand anti-avoidance rule is similar to other, Income Tax Law adds that purpose or eff ect of avoidance is not merely incidental. Tax avoidance agreement is void against Commisioner. Avoidance arrangement can rest upon agreement, plan, contract or understanding, including steps and transactions. Difference between New Zealand and Australia are not in legal defi nitions but in judicial interpretation and application. New Zealand does not rely only on the result that tax was reduced. First dichotomy is between legal form and legal substance and the second on legal and economic substance. Th e tax avoidance test is objective and examines whether the parties would have entered into the transaction even in the absence of the tax advantage. For example in the Case V20 (dentist left partnership and established a trading trust) Justice Barber held that there was no tax avoidance since the tax advantage was incidental to the transaction´s commercially valid chief objectives to protect assets and limit lability and tax savings were minor. Nevertheless, the same dentist in the 1996 income year was judged in the Case W33 and the court concluded that large tax savings of the ICLR, 2011, Vol. 11, No. 1. dentist were not merely incidental. Th ird method refers to the scheme and purpose of the Income Tax Act 2007 (intention of the Parliament). As tax avoidance is regarded inserting a related entity into a transaction in order to create artifi cial deductions (see contrary decision of ECJ mentioned later).
Australia is an example of activist judiciary and eff orts of government to overturn it (reported in 2008). Courts use mainly two interpretative techniques: predication test (similar to New Zealand doctrine described above) and choice principle which was developed by High Court of Australia to protect general provisions of tax law rather than to deny taxpayers the rights to choose between alternatives open to them by that code (e.g. taxpayer can choose legal form but a university can not use tax advantage designed for farming business 8 ). Australia´s current regime of anti-avoidance rule has three components:
1. taxpayer must obtain benefi t, 2. the benefi t must be from scheme, and 3. the scheme must have been entered into by a taxpayer for the sole purpose of obtaining the tax benefi t.
Th e main focus is on dominant purpose. Contrary to New Zealand´s test which is objective, the Australian test is subjective and less general and uncertain. Th e latter is most controversial in purpose test and is interpreted rather narrowly. One remark involves the refl ection that commercial purpose is not always necessary contrary to tax purpose and there is no certainty how the court would diff erentiate between ordinary commercial transactions and tax avoidance. Case described in the paper with tax haven was held against taxpayer as well as splitting home loans into two parts in order to increase the amount of deductible interest.
In France abuse of law is based on reasonableness and is important judicial tool. Abuse of law takes two main forms: social abuse and intentional abuse aimed to harm a third party. French Cassation Court in the middle of 19th century held that tax administration can not challenge taxpayer´s choice of arrangement. Few years later the same court came to the opposite conclusions and recognized the rights of tax administration to examine true substantive nature of the transaction. Para. L 64 of General Tax Code since 1981 (before it was part of Para. 244-1 since 1941) authorized the tax administration to a) disregard a legal act aimed 8 Th e case involved a scheme designed to take advantage of income-averaging rules that were intended to assist pastoral farmers. A unit trust was established and carried on a modest pastoral farming business. Th e trust issued shares for AUD 1 to hundreds of university students in order to enable them to enjoy the tax-preferred status of primary producers. Since 1987 also taxpayers could submit the case to the Committee. Burden of proof fall on the party that received negative opinion from the Committee, otherwise on the tax administration. Since 1981 French Conseil d´Etat ruled that abuse of law comprises also cases where 1. the documents produced by taxpayer are fi ctious and 2. the documents are not fi ctious but they cannot be exaplained or justifi ed by any reason other then the exclusive and intentional purpose of reducing or avoiding tax. Sanctions are 80% increase of tax and parties of abusive transaction are jointly liable for the penalty. Para. L 64 of General Tax Law does not cover all matters, special procedure according to Para. L 64 must be followed strictly when the conditions are met. As to general abuse of law, Conseil d´Etat held in case Janfi n that tax administration is entitled to use general abuse of law principle in situations in which Para. L 64 can not be applied. In such a case the tax administration must prove that transaction was fi ctious. Th e authors of the article describe also application of Para. L 64 and point to one case in which European Court of Justice concluded that Para. L 64 is compatible with Art. 43 of the EC Treaty. To complete recent development I refer to tax news 9 and remark that Para. L 64 was amended in 2008 and abuse of law regards all taxes and since 9. 9. 2010 all decisions of tax administration (notices of French tax administrations 13 L-9-10, 13 M-2 and 13 N-3-10). In 2009 new case-law on abuse of law and dividend tax credits emerged 10 . In two cases Conseil d´Etat denied existence of abuse of law, ruled in favor of taxpayers and suggested that properly structured transactions should be able to withstand a challenge. Tax judges analysed legislative preparatory works and concluded that transaction in question were not in apparent contradiction with the legislator intent. Briefl y, critical test was whether owner of the shares was retaining exposure to the economic risk. Th e fact that the transaction lasted very short period was irrelevant for judges.
However, references on other cases sum up that precedence of EC Treaty and its principle of freedom of establishment is not always in accord with eff orts of EU member states. All members of EU have anti-avoidance rules but in practice they do not determine the scope of their provisions and in many states general abuse of law principle is applied. Anti-avoidance rules deal oft en cross-border situations and doctrines used in member states are able to couse unjustifi ed restrictions on freedom of establishment. Th e defi niton of "wholly artifi cial arrangements" was proposed in case of British company Cadbury Schweppes and its subsidiary in Ireland by Advocat-General and ECJ confi rmed it. He suggested that existence of tax reduction motive is too subjective criterion for the artifi ciality of chosen arrangements. Th e company took into account also level of taxation, like labour costs and infrastructure. Th ere are three criteria to fulfi l and if proved, company does not abuses law. Firstly, the subsidiary in question must be genuinely established in the host state a must have substance and capability of performing services that resulted in reducing tax burden. Secondly, the services of the subsidiary must be of genuine nature, its staff must be competent and make real decisions. Th irdly, the subisidiary must have economic value.
Th e United States with the United Kingdom are regarded as jurisdictions without having an anti-avoidance rule or an abuse of law doctrine (although we could cast doubt on it -as to essence of the issue). What is specifi c and known in connection with the United States, is compliance with the spirit, used from earliest days of the federal income tax law. Landmark decison of the Supreme Court is from 1935 (Gregory v. Helvering). Th e court used sham or business purpose doctrine. Th e sham doctrine is today shortcut phraseoolgy for any number of judicial safeguards -the doctrine of "substance over form", step transactions, economic substance and business purpose. Th e situation in the United States changed dramatically in the 1990s, in the time of rise of tax products. Surprisingly, courts favoured far more taxpayers. Test for economic substance must show that taxpayer subjectively had a non-tax purpose for the transaction and that there is objective of a realistic possibility of a pre-tax profi t. Issues whether the test is exclusive or should be combined with other factors and whether is disjunctive or conjunctive imply uncertainty. Answers given by courts varied. For relevant case law favouring taxpayers I refer to the paper. Interestingly, none of the recent cases was considered by the Supreme Court on the basis of above mentioned safeguards. Textualism used by the courts coused reactions of the Congress and also its fear that the courts usurpe the role of legislative branch. Congress uses plain language in the law, the courts hardly fi nd in the text intent of legislator and this language permits the taxpayers to receive their benefi ts. Shift to the responsibility of legislative branch is then observed. Th ey are expected to provide safeguards in the statutes (see case Compaq). Consequently Senate amended tax bill in 2006 to clarify the economic substance doctrine by conjunctive test. Courts then became more restrained in applying these safeguards.
Simultaneously with establishment of Her Majesty Revenue and Customs in 2005 aiming to reduce tax gap "Anti-Avoidance Group" was set up to systematically and more eff ectively combat tax avoidance. Th at means address three main areas: 1. opportunities to avoid taxes provided by legislation, 2. insuffi ciency of disincentives or deterrents to prevent taxpayers from avoidance schemes and 3. practical diffi culty to identify avoidance transactions quickly. Courts do not recognize sham transactions, however "form over substance" doctrine (or permissive approach) survived until 1980s. Th en were courts confrontated with new and sophisticated tax avoidance devices a judicial attitudes varied. Purposive approach led to summary called "Less chaos, more uncertainty". Th at position was compound by the incorporation of EU principle of abuse of law into the United Kingdom VAT law following ECJ´s Halifax decision. Author of this paper part notes that it will be fascinating how the developed concept will go beyond VAT borders in other tax areas. I must confi rm his concern, refering to Czech case law which I describe later.
Czech tax law is from 1992 based on the doctrine "substance over form" (dissimulation). In Tax Procedure Code of 1992 Para. 2 al. 7 stipulated that while applying tax laws in tax procedure real content of legal act or other fact crucial for collection or assessment of taxes must be taken into account, if the legal act is hidden by diff erent formal act. . Th e Court held that there is dissimulation (hiding) when parties to the transaction pretend certain legal act which they do not really intend and hide another legal act which they mean. Th e key element of application of Para. 7 al. 2 of Tax Procedure Code is to examine relation between intention and demonstration (exercise) of the intent. Obligation of tax administration is to indicate not only ascertained formal situation but also dissimulated real situation and introduce reviewable deliberation leading to the decision including description and consideration of evidence. Dissimulation differs from the circumvention of law when the intention and its demonstration are in accord. Th e issue is whether dissimulation and abuse of law are diff erent tools. Th e answer is: yes. Diff erence is in the intensity of intent of acting parties and also in possibilities of application of abuse of law. Nevertheless, I admit that opinions of various expert may diff er and the issue could be more discussed and may also show how tricky, delicate and weak may be both approaches.
According to Czech experts of constitutional law Aleš Gerloch and Jan Tryzna principle of ban on abuse of law resembles principle of ban of exercise of law against good moral.
11 Authors refer to Czech private case law and conclude that qualifi cation of legal act as abuse of law is rather strict. In contrast with this approach there is decision of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court (of 10. 11. 2005, No. 1 Afs 107/2004 -48). Th e facts of the case are as follows: parents of children established non-profi t association and through gift s fi nanced sports, cultural and educational activities of their children. Th en they deducted these sums from the income tax base. Th e court held that in these cases must tax administration always consider if this is abuse of law. Court also concluded that this case does not deal with dissimulation but abuse of law. Gerloch and Tryzna regard the case as interesting due to several reasons. Firstly, the case deals with public law and in that branch principle of legality should be applied unconditionally. Th e Tax Procedure Code of 1992 did not know the term "abuse of law". Th erefore they consider issueable whether court is legitimate to use such an argument (if I follow up this idea, in certain perspective there could be observed abuse of power of the court; the same is valid for tax or other administration). Authors of the paper express objections that abuse of law is institute of private law and that the government (state, tax administration) can not "bully" taxpayers. Th ey also appeal for consistent application of abuse of law if it had been already defi ned by the Supreme Court in private law. Experts also refer to another case of the Supreme Administrative Court (7 Afs 115/2004) where the argumentation diff ered and suggested that tax administration can consider the act in question according to its content, not form (dissimulation). Although authors express concerns that freedom of deliberation (and I would watch the same problems in decision-making of administrative bodies), they fi nally support application of extralegal standards. Jointly, they warn that in such an approach the cases with the same facts and substance could be considered diff erently. Authors suggest that scope of rules for judicial deliberation should be at least in the Czech Republic stipulated by legislator. Only he is entitled to determine this. Especially in public law the approach to application of abuse of law should be restricitve although to specify unanimous guide is impossible. Authors consider very general scope of rules, as well as very casuistic rules as improper. Judith Freedman 12 analyses strenghts and weaknesses of so called principle-based legislation in the times when under infl uence of European law and judiciary the approach to tax law has been changing. Th e role of primary and secundary legislation is discussed. Th e principles in primary legislation can mean legitimate expactations, certainty, equality and proportionality. Judiciary would be safeguard. Principles has higher level then broad or umbiguous rule. Principles have exceptions and they could be in confl ict -secondary norms can not be in confl ict -always one of them has priority. With principles there is no absence of legitimity both for courts and administration. Some regard principles only as a tool to help for interpretation. If we admit that there are gaps in law, we suppose that intention of lawmaker is not clear and that courts make law. Where are principles, there is no gap. Th is concept can function only if we trust tax administration and judiciary. Th ere is a paradox here: principles-based regulation can give rise to a relationship of trust, but this relationship has to exist for principles-based regulation to be eff ective (see footnote 24). It is noteworthy that we can not mix principle-based legislation and purposive interpretation of law. In 1969 British judges were criticised for narrow and formalistic interpretation what changed later. British tax administration began to use provisions of the law containing writen purposes (object clauses). In contrast, the principle needs to capture the outcomes in a way that is "intuitive or obvious to someone who understands the law's context". Argument against this concepts shows uncertainty and the fact that it switches the burden from the revenue authority, which must currently show that something is included in the charging provision, to the taxpayer, who must now show that a case is specifi cally excluded. Lenghty tax and court proceedings help nobody. With use of principle-based regulation would have tax administation issue further legislation and would have less discretion leeway. Australian experiment with principle-based regulation was not entirely successful. Th e issue is what was the cause. On the other hand, too much discretion entitled to administratuon and courts can lead to discussion on separation of powers and to the question if they are ready to cope with that. Principle-based regulation supplement strategy against tax-avoidance. Some experts believe that application of principle-based legislation would favour tax administration before courts. Concept of principles does not intend to involve morality into tax law. Th e issue is just to give eff ect to intention of Parliament. One major problem with using principles is that tax law is very abstract and may not always relate well to the real world, tax law oft en aims at special groups. Too sophisticated concept led in the past to technical character of tax law and was good basis for tax-avoidance. According to Freedman, associating principle-based legislation with a complex, non-intuitive and highly artifi cial area and with anti-avoidance legislation, tax administratuon (HMRC) have made this experiment diffi cult for themselves. Important is to defi ne what is principle a how it is applied. Some indeterminacy is an essential feature of law and the important thing is that the law should provide a guide to the answers. Th e current route of ever increasing amounts of detailed legislation cannot continue and we need to fi nd ways to improve the situation. Th e same opinion expressed earlier president of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court Josef Baxa in 2006.
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III. Administrative law and abuse of rights
As to administrative law, there is one landmark decision of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court regarding procedure on driving off ences. Th e Court held in the Case (of 4. 5. 2011, No. 1 As 27/2011-81) that granting power of attorney to a person from Kuwait is abuse of law. In this case nobody has ever seen that person, there are doubts if this person even exists and this person is not lawyer (in the Czech Republic there are no qualifi cation requirements for persons representing off enders in administrative proceedings or in court of fi rst instance). Th e similar cases involved instructed persons from Somalia and similar delivering problems (e.g. the Czech Republic has no bilateral treaty regarding delivering post, or in this countries delivering post lasted reportedly about nine months whereas the term to end off ence proceedings for administration is stipulated as one year including coming into force of the decision). Interesting is that above mentioned decision declares right of state to fair process.
In my practice I also met arguments of both parties (claimants and government) of application morality in administrative law. Although some Czech scholars deny this approach, it became reality for parties to the disputes. If my research was exhaustive, there is no decision of the Supreme Administrative Court which has dealt with the issue of morality in administrative law.
Conclusions
What have all defi nitions of abuse of law in common? Firstly, it is intent (to get advantage by creating artifi cial situation). Secondly, we ask how to fi nd it, by subjective or objective criteria, or both, or plus others? It seems that subjective test was completed with objective part. I mentioned above various defi nitions of abuse of law (rights) which more or less diff er. Necessarily I ask, is it at all something new? Th e answer is: yes and no. Th ere are another concepts -similar or diff erent -and they deal also with extralegal and/or legal standards (morality, good faith; frauds, tax avoidance, tax evasion, dissimiluation, circumvention of law etc.).
According to John and Zoë Prebble, administrations and courts have gone some way towards setting line between legal mitigation and illegal abuse of law. In spite of that eff ort, there is still considerable uncertainty which constitutes negative feature of general anti-avoidance rule. Nonetheless, concrete rules are the most open to avoidance. Th e line between tax mitigation and avoidance is fi ne. Various interests must be balanced and preventing tax avoidance must be addressed in consistent way, predictable and fair so that taxpayers can manage their aff airs intelligently, confi dently and in good faith. For EU member states balancing is even more complex. Th ey must balance furthermore between their and EU legislation (especially take into account freedom of establishment). Approach of ECJ is formalistic and permissive of tax avoidance. Regardless of existence of provisions containing objective, purpose of statutes (law), this objective is always known (it is to collect taxes). Negative side of purposive approach (or also unlimited general anti-avoidance rule) is that this interpretation would always lead to the result in favour of tax administration. Experts agreed that the lower tax rates and the broader tax base, the less propensity of tax payers to attempt to avoid tax. Some assume that taxpayers are provoked by the tax rates and legislation. Still the experience (in the United States) indicates that lowering rates does not lead simply to lowering tax avoidance. Legislation must operate in real world, including political world. Another problem is huge amount of legislative. Contribution of the quoted article can be seen not in proposing eff ective solution but rather in specifying essential issues.
Michael Byers suggests in his paper on abuse of rights in international law 14 that the prinicple (of abuse rights) is supplemental to the principle of good faith. I can follow up this idea and suggest that in public law should be abuse of law applied (also) in respect to principle of legitimate expactation. Byers refers to number of scholars who have suggested that unnecessary and extreme but otherwise legal actions taken by a state against its own population, including mass revocations of nationality so as to cause statelessness, could be regarded as abuses of rights. Another area where abuse of rights fi nds application is with regard to activities that occur outside the territory of any state, in "common spaces" such as the high seas, or in multiple states without any particular territorial nexus, as is the case with the Internet and some sources of pollution. Territory is becoming a less salient feature of the international legal landscape as contemporary problems increasingly reach across and beyond state borders, blurring traditional concepts of sovereignty and responsibility (see page 423-424 of his paper). Byers thinks that in the absence of more specifi c rules and principles, international courts and tribunals faced with these issues could, and probably should, look to abuse of rights as a general principle of law whose violation in itself constitutes a wrong giving rise to state responsibility and notes that rights may be abused either immediately or prospectively. He serves also with examples of expropriation of property. Author refers to Wolfgang Friedmann´s notice that the notions, for example, of "equity," "reasonableness" or "abuse of rights" ... do, and are bound to, diff er widely. Byers highlights that the rights of states are no longer general and primordial. He expressed this in respect to international law. My question is whether we can say this in connection with application in public law (and abuse of law etc.) inside the national state.
What is imanent to law, each actor's rights are necessarily limited by the rights and interests of others (and also state and society has their rights).
When we regard as crucial intent, then there is resemblance to criminal law. Should we use more principles of criminal law while considering abuse of law? I referred above to several opinions which explain their arguments. To conclude, in many jurisdictions principles like in dubio mitius or interpreation following merely explicitly expressed obligations in public law are applied.
Unity of legal system is unanimously agreed principle by all experts. Should there be one perception of abuse of law principle? If the Czech Supreme Administrative Court declares that application of abuse of law in administrative (public) law (to be precise -in driving off ence cases) must be extraordinary, does it complies with reality of acting of off enders? As Pulkrábek in private law suggests (and derives this from his judicial practice) that abuse of law is found oft en, and the same applies to reality in public law, how can be (above all in administrative penal law) abuse of law applied as extraordinary tool or ultima ratio? Th e only way how to deal with this issue is in my opinion to regard abuse of law as ordinary tool or to label the same situation by the same concept, just called not abuse of law and -for example -circumvention of law, dissimulation etc. Diff erence could by sometimes only rhetorical -strong word just provokes not winning party to the proceedings.
Moreover, there is something else what attacks sometimes hardly found unity of legal order and it is infl uence of community law -Czech law as any other national laws faces many challenges itself and EC law brings new appeals.
In many areas, it may in practice be impossible to maintain parallel concepts of abuse of right; and we may well see the adoption of the EC concept (or concepts) in the legal systems of some at least of the member states even in areas of the law that are not, de iure, aff ected by EC law (e.g. tax and administrative law).
Another issue is whether administrative bodies (agencies) are entitled to conclude that in the case was abuse of law? Quoted papers suggest that this issue is dealt chiefl y by courts, but example of the United Kingdom or France display that also special units in administrations can address this issue. Same result can be observed in the Czech Republic. In my practice I have judged cases where administration explicitly found abuse of law in driving off ence cases, as I described above (but here abuse of law was considered not by special units).
Back to the defi niton and features of abuse of law like intent and spirit of the law. In my opinion, decision-maker must have strong sense for and knowledge of reality, fashion of interpretation, avoid formalism and sometimes maybe also judicial and administrative activism. Process is always communication. To have eff ective process, it is necessary to be confi dent that we speak the same language and that there are not two or more monologues, this is in my opinion really very important and it is not at all simple to achieve that goal.
Another problem are duality of legal norms (natural and positive), rule of law and general acceptance and position of law and good moral in society and problem of legitimity and quality of decision-makers (in all three powers systems), all these aspect infl uence justice, fairness and equity.
As Judith Freedman said, a diff erent approach to the way we legislate could both improve the way we think about policy and result in better implementation, application and legitimacy in decision making. Principles-based draft ing is not ICLR, 2011, Vol. 11, No. 1. a solution to all ills. Nevertheless, it could off er one route, in appropriate cases, to improvement as well as, in other cases, highlighting the need for more fundamental reform. We should not give up this experiment simply because it has not yet delivered total success. No new draft ing technique can deliver a perfect (tax) system, but it is worth preserving with principles-based legislation.
I join Lasok and his reference to opinion of Advocate General Tesauro in the Kefalas case who said: "any legal order which aspires to achieve a minimum level of completion must contain self-protection measures…to ensure that the rights it confers are not exercised in a manner which is abusive, excessive or distorted". He also took the view that abuse of right is "a legal concept which certainly has a home, or at least a foundation, in well-established legal systems, but much less so in a legal order like that of the Community, whose evolution towards integration is far from being capable of being considered to be complete". Also the Czech law has still been changing rather dramatically and has been infl uenced by EC law.
According to Javier Barnes we have administration of third generation which aims the best solution 15 . However, do we know what is the best solution?
According to Richard Posner both the extreme of hyperlegalism and the opposite extreme of a purely discretionary system of justice (and according to me also of administration) are found only in primitive societies. Mature societies mix strict law with discretion. 16 In my opinion we must not give up eff orts and we should weigh various values, to have in mind entirety (holistic approach -that means also to know enough about reality), communicate well and struggle to reach perfection, or at least come closer to it, and this includes to ask relevant questions and try to do our best to fi nd best answers. Recent fragile social situation put challenges on weighing values and parties to the proceedings and administrations and courts face expactations how to bring together legal and social harmony.
